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Recently, in Lyons v. The Legal Aid Society, the Second Circuit held that an employer might be required to pay for a parking space as a reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee, even though it does not as a matter of policy provide parking to any other employees.

Beth Lyons, a Legal Aid staff attorney in New York City, was struck by an automobile in 1989 as she was leaving her parked car. She received near fatal injuries that required multiple reconstructive surgeries and constant physical therapy. Four and half years after the accident, Ms. Lyons returned to work and asked Legal Aid to accommodate her disability by paying for a parking space near her office and the courts in which she practiced. Ms. Lyons claimed that she would be unable to take public transportation because it would require her to walk distances, climb stairs and stand for periods of time beyond her capability. Legal Aid denied the request.

Ms. Lyons sued claiming that Legal Aid’s refusal to pay for parking was a failure to accommodate her disability, which violated both the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Legal Aid moved to dismiss Ms. Lyons’ complaint, arguing that it did not provide any employee with parking or any other commuting assistance and, therefore, Ms. Lyons sought preferential treatment. Legal Aid also argued that the accommodation requirements of the federal disability discrimination laws were not so broad as to require accommodations in getting to and from work. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.

The Scope of “Reasonable Accommodation”
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that Legal Aid had an obligation to accommodate Ms. Lyons’ request for parking even though it did not provide parking or payment for parking for other employees. The appeals court reasoned that Congress, in enacting a “reasonable accommodation” requirement, intended that an employer may be required to provide a disabled employee with benefits that it does not provide non-disabled employees.

The appeals court also rejected Legal Aid’s argument that Ms. Lyons’ request for payment for parking was a request for a “personal amenity” unrelated to the essential functions of her position. Rather, the court concluded that Ms Lyons’ ability to reach her office was an essential prerequisite to her work and that she could not fulfill her responsibilities as an attorney without being able to get to her office and the courts. Thus, the court held that Ms. Lyons had stated a claim and ordered her case to proceed.

The Lyons case teaches that a request for a “reasonable accommodation” requires an employer to explore options and rethink policies. Merely adhering to existing policy or practice in the face of an accommodation request can potentially conflict with the mandates of the ADA as well as the Rehabilitation Act.